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AbsTrACT
Introduction Devolution reforms in Indonesia and Kenya 
have brought extensive changes to governance structures 
and mechanisms for financing and delivering healthcare. 
Community health approaches can contribute towards 
attaining many of devolution’s objectives, including 
community participation, responsiveness, accountability 
and improved equity. We set out to examine governance in 
two countries at different stages in the devolution journey: 
Indonesia at 15 years postdevolution and Kenya at 3 years.
Methods We collected qualitative data across multiple 
levels of the health system in one district in Indonesia 
and ten counties in Kenya, through 80 interviews and 
six focus group discussions (FGD) in Indonesia and 269 
interviews and 14 FGDs in Kenya. Qualitative data were 
digitally recorded, transcribed and coded before thematic 
framework analysis. Common themes between contexts 
were identified inductively and deductively, and similarities 
and differences critically analysed during an inter-country 
analysis workshop.
results Following devolution both Indonesia and 
Kenya experienced similar challenges ensuring good 
governance for health. Devolution reforms transformed 
power relationships, increasing responsibilities at 
subnational levels and introducing opportunities for 
citizen participation. In both contexts, the impact of these 
mechanisms has been undermined by insufficiently 
clear guidance; failure to address pre-existing negative 
contextual norms and practices varied decision-maker 
values, limited priority-setting capacity and limited genuine 
community accountability. As a consequence, priorities in 
both contexts are too often placed on curative rather than 
preventive health services.
Conclusion We recommend consideration of increased 
intersectoral actions that address social determinants of 
health, challenge negative norms and practices and place 
emphasis on community-based primary health services.
InTroduCTIon
Decentralisation is a dynamic process that 
transfers authorities or powers for deci-
sion making, planning and management 
of public services from national to subna-
tional levels.1 Decentralisation reforms also 
have implications for governance, due to 
the reallocation of authority and resources, 
affecting internal power relationships and 
access of actors to the decision-making 
process and state resources.2 Reforms may be 
classified as four main types: deconcentration 
occurs when authority for administrative func-
tions shifts to subnational offices within the 
Ministry of Health; delegation occurs when 
semiautonomous agencies are granted new 
powers (typically still administrative); devolu-
tion occurs when administrative, political and 
fiscal responsibilities shift to the subnational 
level of locally elected government and priva-
tisation occurs when ownership is granted to 
private bodies.3 4 
Governance is widely recognised as central 
to improving health sector performance 
and achieving universal health coverage 
(UHC).5 However, it is political, the result of 
Key questions
What is already known?
 ► Decentralisation is a dynamic process; transfer 
of powers for decision  making have  governance 
implications.
 ► Few studies have examined the implications of 
devolution for strengthening community governance 
and accountability.
What are the new findings?
 ► Despite a 15-year difference in time frame, 
Indonesia and Kenya experience many similar gov-
ernance challenges, which threaten the success of 
devolution reforms.
 ► Limited technical capacity and community engage-
ment, with weak accountability structures, can mean 
priorities may be distorted from attaining universal 
health coverage.
What do the new findings imply?
 ► Well-supported and empowered community health 
workers are potentially key actors to promote gen-
uine community engagement with decision-making 
processes following health reforms.
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interactions, coordination and decision-making among 
different actors in the face of multiple views and inter-
ests.6 7 In this paper, we define governance as being ‘a 
process whereby societies or organizations make their 
important decisions, determine whom they involve 
in the process and how they render account’ (p. 1).8 
Decentralisation that enables responsiveness to local 
needs and values has been identified as a key governance 
mechanism for influencing health outcomes.9 Reforms, 
such as devolution bring expectations for improved 
service delivery, increased responsiveness to community 
demands, increased accountability and greater efficiency, 
equity and expansion of UHC.3 4 10–13 Yet, past experi-
ences with devolution teach us it is a complex process, 
outcomes can be unpredictable and it may lead to 
widening disparities and mixed implications for account-
ability processes.13–15 There is need to think through 
the governance mechanisms and accountability impli-
cations of reforms, ensuring clear knowledge of roles, 
responsibilities and process within priority-setting, with 
strong capacity and accountability.11 13 16–21 This requires 
awareness of how political, social, economic and cultural 
context and norms, values held by actors and changing 
power balance create the ‘de facto’ decision space, which 
may differ from the ‘de jure’ decision space described in 
formal laws and regulations.19 22 23
Community health services have an important role 
to play in attaining UHC by involving and empowering 
communities to improve knowledge, change health-re-
lated beliefs, behaviours and improve access and uptake 
of health services.24 Empowerment of diverse stake-
holders in decision making, community engagement 
and enhanced social capital, along with decentralisa-
tion, form the four main mechanisms for governance.9 
Community health services could therefore be expected 
to form the backbone for health service provision and 
community engagement following devolution, given the 
overlap with the commonly identified objectives for devo-
lution. The role of community health services following 
devolution reforms was a key emerging theme in recent 
community health context analyses conducted in both 
Kenya and Indonesia.25–27 In Kenya, a study carried out 
in the months surrounding the introduction of devolu-
tion’s reforms highlighted widespread recognition of 
the need for more holistic care at community level with 
support for incorporation of home-based testing and 
counselling for HIV within existing community health 
activities.28 Historically, however, subnational authori-
ties have often emphasised investment in curative over 
preventive services after decentralisation reforms, with 
resultant neglect of public health in the Philippines and 
Indonesia.4 29 30
In both Indonesia and Kenya, administrative, political 
and fiscal responsibilities were transferred from central 
government to subnational authorities following the intro-
duction of nationwide ‘big-bang’ devolution reforms (see 
table 1). With rapid, politically motivated decentralisation 
reforms of this nature, there are often initially increased 
discretionary powers at the new subnational levels, with 
accountability measures following later.13 Successful 
devolution depends on successful identification of priori-
ties and strong governance principles applied at national, 
subnational and local levels. Governance may depend on 
guidance set at national level, but it is operationalised at 
lower levels and so analysis should recognise the impor-
tance of actors at lower health systems levels.7 9 We set out 
to examine governance across health systems levels with 
implications for community health services, identifying 
similarities and differences in two countries at different 
stages in the devolution journey for healthcare.
MeTHodology
Methods and approach
We used qualitative methods as these allowed the induc-
tive generation of rich data by seeking to understand the 
‘why’ and ‘how’ questions about devolution and commu-
nity health services within specific contexts.31 32 We 
selected Indonesia and Kenya from among the six coun-
tries involved in the REACHOUTi consortium’s work on 
the equity and effectiveness of community health workers 
because devolution had been highlighted as a contextual 
issue affecting community health worker programmes 
within these countries.25–27
Mixed qualitative methods including key informant 
interviews, in-depth interviews with close-to-communityii 
(CTC) providers and their supervisors and focus group 
discussions with community members were applied sepa-
rately in each country. In Indonesia, questions probing 
governance and devolution were added within the topic 
guide used for studies conducted before and after a 
quality improvement intervention (studies carried out in 
2014 and 2015). Meanwhile, in Kenya, a separate substudy 
was conducted to explore priority-setting for community 
health and equity following devolution (April 2015–April 
2016), and these data were analysed along with data 
collected for the mixed methods REACHOUT quality 
improvement baseline (March–April 2015). The topic 
guides used in both countries included similar issues but 
different questions and probes. Other findings from the 
study carried out in Kenya, which explore the implica-
tions of changing priority-setting processes for commu-
nity health and equity, have been published elsewhere.33
In Indonesia, all data were collected by Indonesian 
nationals working as part of the REACHOUT consor-
tium in Bahasa Indonesia. Meanwhile, in Kenya national, 
county and some health worker level interviews were 
i REACHOUT is an ambitious 5 year international research consortium 
aiming to generate knowledge to strengthen the performance of CHWs 
and other close-to-community (CTC) providers in promotional, preven-
tive and curative primary health services in six low- and middle-income 
countries in rural and urban areas in Africa and Asia, including Indo-
nesia and Kenya. http://www.reachoutconsortium.org/
ii Close-to- community providers, are health workers forming the first 
point of contact at community level, having up to 3 years para- profes-
sional training, so this group includes auxiliary staff and CHWs.75
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carried out by a foreign researcher (PhD student) in 
English language (RM). Community and some health 
facility level respondents in Kenya were interviewed by 
trained research assistants working with REACHOUT 
consortium in Kiswahili or Kamba (depending on 
respondents’ preference). All researchers were trained 
and experienced in using qualitative methods. None of 
the researchers had prior relationship with any of the 
research participants.
Country context
Both countries have histories of highly centralised and 
hierarchical government, which had created expectations 
of national accountability and had left a legacy of 
patronage and mismanagement of funds.34 35 At the 
time of the study, both Indonesia and Kenya were lower 
middle-income economies, with wide income inequali-
ties and uneven access to health services between popula-
tion groups36 37 (see box 1 and table 1).
site and respondent selection
Study sites were selected purposively. In Indonesia, selec-
tion was based on high maternal mortality (since this was 
the focal research area within REACHOUT study), and 
in Kenya, selection ensured representation of agrarian, 
pastoralist and urban with varied poverty levels and 
Table 1 Comparison between Kenya and Indonesia35 37 44 46 57 59 66–74
Indonesia Kenya
Context and informal 
practices, norms and 
structures
255.18 million people, lower middle-income country.
Gained independence in 1945.
Former centralised government.
Wide geographic, socioeconomic and disease burden 
disparities across the country (17 000 islands).
Wide health service coverage and outcome 
disparities.
International pressure to devolve.
Little authority or autonomy prior to devolution.
President desired a rapid reform and transfer of 
responsibilities to district level to avoid provincial level 
unrest (following previous violence at this level).
46 million people, lower middle-income country.
Gained independence in 1963.
Former centralised government.
Wide geographic, socioeconomic and disease 
burden disparities across the country (single 
land mass).
Wide health service coverage and outcome 
disparities.
International pressure to devolve.
Former deconcentration of administrative 
functions.
Rapid reforms and transfer of responsibilities 
to county level, following pressure from 
county level actors, although structures not 
yet established and capacity not in place to 
manage devolved functions at that time.
Content of formal 
devolution reforms
Political
Started in 2001 with rapid roll out.
Three-tier government (national, provincial and 
district).
32 provinces and 440 districts.
Political
Started in 2013 with rapid roll out.
Two-tier government (national and county).
47 counties.
Fiscal
National level retain control of the greatest share of 
revenue.
Funding at subnational levels from three possible 
sources:
1. Transfers from central government, including tax-
sharing from nationally generated revenue.
2. Locally generated revenue, including taxation.
3. Special allocation funds for remote or less 
developed areas, plus emergency financing in the 
event of a natural disaster).
Fiscal
Minimum of 15% of revenue is to be shared 
with counties.
Funding at subnational county level from five 
possible sources:
1. Transfers from central government.
2. Locally generated revenue.
3. Donor funding.
4. Conditional grants.
5. An equalisation fund from national level for 
14 previously marginalised counties
Administrative (health).
Provincial level – coordinate functions among 
districts; draft policies that should then be 
implemented by all districts within the province; 
supervision of districts.
District level – make decisions on priorities; deliver 
public goods and services, including health.
Administrative (health).
County government holds responsibility for 
planning, management and budgeting.
County level – make decisions on priorities 
by drafting county integrated development 
plan; annual planning and budgeting; service 
delivery for public health, disease surveillance, 
community health services, primary health 
services, ambulance, county hospital services; 
recruitment and human resource management 
(includes facility and community health 
workers); and partner coordination.
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coverage with maternal health as well as other key health 
indicators (to provide diverse range of counties studied). 
In both contexts, participants were selected purposively, 
in order to identify those who could contribute valuable 
information (see table 2). More information about the 
repsondents interviewed in Kenya have been presented 
elsewhere (see table 4, McCollum et al).33 Respondents 
were contacted in advance by via telephone or intro-
duction by a known contact, such as their supervisor 
or Community Health Worker (CHW). Interviews and 
discussions were carried out at a location convenient for 
the respondents, often at their place of work for health 
workers or at an easily accessible community meeting 
point. Topic guides were used to explore local politics, 
support from local government for community and/
or maternal health, equity of health services and CTC 
service delivery across both countries. Interviews and 
FGDs typically lasted between 30 min and 90 min.
Indonesia primary data
Semistructured interviews with 80 participants and 6 
focus group respondents were conducted in one district 
in West Java Province (see table 2). Purposive sampling 
was used to identify respondents for in-depth interviews 
with health stakeholders (Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat 
(puskesmas) (community health centre) and District 
Health Office officials); non-health stakeholders (subdis-
trict and village officials); healthcare providers (village 
midwives, kaderiii and traditional birth attendants) and 
community members (including women who were preg-
nant in the past 2 years and men).
Kenya primary data
Interviews with 86 CTC providers and their supervi-
sors and 14 focus group discussions with a further 146 
community members were carried out in two counties 
as part of the REACHOUT quality improvement base-
line study. A further 183 interviews were conducted as 
part of the substudy. These included 14 key informant 
interviews with national-level respondents and in-depth 
interviews with 120 county-level decision makers (tech-
nical, political, treasury, gender and children’s represent-
atives) across 10 diverse counties. In three of these coun-
ties, data from interviews with 49 health workers (health 
facility and community level) were included.
data analysis
This paper will present findings from a secondary anal-
ysis of qualitative data from Indonesia and Kenya. It 
will provide an overview of similarities and differences 
between governance mechanisms since devolution and 
potential implications for community health. Data from 
both countries were digitally recorded, transcribed and 
coded using NVivo 10, before framework analysis was 
conducted. Common governance themes were identi-
fied both inductively and deductively, allowing meaning 
to emerge from the data32 through data familiarisa-
tion by reading and rereading narratives drafted from 
governance-related themes between REACHOUT data 
collected in both countries and the Kenyan substudy 
(see figure 1 which presents the common themes across 
both contexts and their inter-relationship). A data anal-
ysis workshop involving researchers from both contexts 
was held, during which thematic framework analysis was 
carried out with data compared across and between coun-
tries to search for similarities and differences in order to 
refine themes for further analysis. Emerging from this 
workshop, we identified three main themes: contextual 
norms, politics and power dynamics; the influence of 
power, leadership capacity and values on priority-setting 
iii Kader is a community health volunteer who carries out primarily 
maternal and child health services, including family planning at village 
level.
box 1 Country context
Indonesia devolved administrative and operational functions to 32 
provinces and 440 districts in 2001, with districts responsible for 
managerial and financial responsibilities for public health30 (see 
table 1). Indonesia has a three-tier devolved government with national, 
provincial and district authorities. In Indonesia, reforms were driven 
in response to economic crisis, the fall of the Suharto regime and 
strong international pressure.30 Indonesia’s devolution reforms aim 
to improve quality and reduce costs for public services, including 
health.30
Following the financial crisis in 1997, there has been an increasing 
transition towards privatisation contributing to reduced spending for 
preventive health alongside an increasing role for private insurance 
companies.44 Previous studies have reported that in the eagerness 
to reform following devolution, socioeconomic conditions (wide 
differences in the ability of districts to generate revenue and up to 
50-fold variation in income per capita between districts) have been 
overlooked, with variation in ability to pay for services and hence in 
access to healthcare.30
Kenya has a shorter history with devolution, having adopted a two-
tier devolved government (with national and county level authorities), 
transferring planning, management and budgeting responsibilities 
for a range of services, including health, from central government to 
47 new subnational governments, (now known as counties) in 2013 
(see table 1). Kenya’s reforms were driven by increasing frustration 
with inefficiencies and inequities associated with the former 
centralised government process and in response to growing local and 
international pressure following the postelection violence of 2007–
2008.41 Devolution aims in Kenya seek to strengthen democracy 
and accountability, enhance national unity, increase community 
participation, improve efficiency and reduce inequities.59
Kenya’s central government have sought to address historic 
inequities through transfer of the equitable share funding from central 
government to county governments, determined by the commission 
for revenue allocation formula,66 which takes into account each 
county’s poverty level, along with the equalisation fund for formerly 
marginalised counties.59 Formerly marginalised counties now benefit 
from higher levels of funding, along with the decision space to invest 
in health. At the county level, there is no formal guidance to clarify 
how county budget should be allocated, as a result contextual factors, 
power dynamics and values play key roles in determining how the 
budget is allocated.
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and decision making; and community accountability and 
empowerment.
Quality assurance and ethics
Discussions and interviews conducted in Bahasa Indo-
nesia, Kiswahili or Kikamba were translated to English, 
with a selection (approximately 10%) back-translated 
for quality checking. Data collection continued until 
saturation was reached, and data were triangulated 
between sources to minimise bias. All respondents gave 
written informed consent, which highlighted the main 
study objectives. All study findings, including quotations, 
have been appropriately anonymised, and data collected 
through this study was safely stored in a password-pro-
tected laptop to ensure confidentiality. This study 
Table 2 Respondent demographics in Indonesia
QIC1 (baseline and endline) Male Female # of respondents
District level semistructured interviews
  Health system officer (MCH of DHO) 0 2 2
Total county-level health respondents 0 2 2
Subdistrict-level semistructured interviews
  Health system manager* 0 3 3
  Non-health system stakeholder 2 0 2
  NGO 1 0 1
Total respondents 3 3 6
Community health semistructured interviews
  Community health volunteer (kader Posyandu) 6 19 25
  Village midwife 0 6 6
  Head of village 2 10 12
  Mother 0 29 29
Total SSI respondents 8 64 72
Total participants 11 69 80
FGDs
  Community health volunteer (kader Posyandu) 0 1 1
  TBA 0 1 1
  Men in the village 2 0 2
  Mother 0 2 2
Total FGD 2 4 6
*The health system manager is the person with the highest authority at the subdistrict level. He or she is the head of the Puskesmas and is 
typically a physician or dentist, or someone with a public health background.
DHO, District Health Office; FGD, focus group discussion; TBA, traditional birth attendant; NGO, Non Governmental Organisation; MCH, 
Maternal Child Health; QIC1 , Quality Improvement Cycle 1 
Figure 1 Common themes from Indonesia and Kenya.
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fulfils COnsolidated criteria for REporting Qualitative 
research criteria for qualitative research.38 
resulTs And dIsCussIon
Indonesia and Kenya experience many similar challenges 
to good governance and to attaining improved service 
delivery, despite differing timeframes with implementing 
devolution reforms. In both countries, good governance 
has been hindered to varying degrees, through failure 
to adequately consider the accountability implications 
of reforms in light of prior contextual norms, such as 
patronage; varied values held by decision-making actors, 
such as the value of visible and politically popular infra-
structure over ‘invisible’ community health services; 
limited capacity for health priority-setting by key deci-
sion makers, including politicians and technical actors at 
the time of introduction of reforms; and limited genuine 
community empowerment and engagement in account-
ability for decision-making (see figure 1). We combine 
our results and discussion, in order to both present and 
analyse our results, in light of differing devolution time-
frames—immediately following introduction of reforms 
in Kenya and 15 years later in Indonesia, and situate our 
analyses within the literature on devolution, including 
the literature about Indonesia’s early experiences.
Contextual norms, politics and power dynamics
Structural forces resulting from colonialism have contrib-
uted to wide inequities between regions in both Indo-
nesia and Kenya, yet the policy response to these inequi-
ties varied widely (see box 1). Prior to the introduction 
of devolution reforms, both countries were governed by 
strong centralised governments, where patronage norms 
and nepotism were commonplace.34 35 Our findings reveal 
that in both Indonesia and Kenya, these have continued 
since devolution, creating a threat to governance mech-
anisms. We found that nepotism was widely described by 
almost all respondents in Indonesia, indicating its contin-
uation over time and its embedment since devolution. In 
Kenya, nepotism was also described, although to a much 
lesser extent than in Indonesia, highlighting potential 
opportunity for change. Politicians are often motivated 
to provide services that will appeal to their electorate, 
consolidate political support and maximise their voter 
base in their pursuit of re-election.39 In both coun-
tries, the provision of health (and other services) was 
already politically motivated prior to devolution.40 41 This 
continued politicisation has in some instances brought 
positive results towards improving access to health 
services, with UHC recognised as an ‘electoral asset’ in 
Indonesia, with popular health schemes felt to contribute 
towards electoral success.40 Similarly, our findings from 
Kenya highlight that several years into devolution, some 
politicians are beginning to appreciate the potential 
political benefits associated with expanding community 
health services.
It’s (primary/community health care) also good politically 
because you have created employment, you have encour-
aged someone so they show their appreciation where elec-
tions come. So politically it's a bonus. Kenya non-health 
respondent, male 32 
Unfortunately, rather than proving to be the norm, 
these positive examples appear to have been exceptions. 
We found that patronage continues to influence the provi-
sion of health services since devolution in both Indonesia 
and Kenya, contributing to varied levels of service provi-
sion within a subnational district or county. In Indonesia, 
a few respondents including health officials, village heads 
and kaders felt that the level of development within their 
village varied widely according to whether the commu-
nity had supported the elected leader in the previous 
election or not. This is in keeping with previous findings 
that local governments were perceived to distribute funds 
unevenly in favour of subdistricts with a high electoral 
support rate, in order to consolidate power.42 Similarly in 
Kenya, we found resources were commonly described by 
community and county technical actors, as having been 
channelled to the home area for the governor (elected 
leader in the county) or another powerful politician, with 
development investment at times provided according to 
political affiliation, rather than need. As the World Devel-
opment Report (2004) identifies, poor citizens often have 
limited influence with politicians about public services. 
They may be poorly informed about services and may 
vote along ethnic lines, leaving the provision of public 
services susceptible to political patronage, with clinics 
built-in areas where supporters live.17
For example,the current regent, when we asked for sup-
port from him, he preferred to give support (financial as-
sistance) to the areas where he got many votes from the 
previous election. Indonesia village health official, male 04
In a democracy, political parties tend to move towards 
the position of the median voter in order to secure (re)
election, regardless of the efficiency or equity impli-
cations of those decisions.39 This is likely to lead to the 
neglect and further marginalisation of smaller population 
groups such as people living in hard-to-reach or sparsely 
populated nomadic areas, while resources are focused on 
heavily populated areas where there are a lot of votes.43 
Within Indonesia, where experiences with devolution 
are longer, there has been a reported deterioration in 
public health services, with reduced access among poorer 
populations.30 44 The picture within Kenya so far appears 
mixed, with national government having introduced 
policy for free maternity services around the same time as 
devolution reforms were introduced, leading to increased 
utilisation of services.45 However, success of this policy 
has been complicated by uncertainty created by devolu-
tion and poor planning, with health facilities having been 
inadequately compensated for lost fees, leading health 
workers to raise revenue from patients, with implications 
for the most poor.45 Additionally, in Kenya, we found 
that politicians frequently gave preference to priorities 
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deemed as popular with the electorate, such as construc-
tion of new health facilities or purchase of ambulances.33 
These were frequently referred to as ‘high vote’ prior-
ities, meanwhile health promotion or disease preven-
tion activities were not viewed as politically favourable. 
Now is an opportune time for Kenya to reflect on lessons 
learnt from other countries with longer experiences with 
devolution, such as Indonesia, in order to ensure that 
priorities reflect those that will promote public health, as 
well as curative services, which are often more politically 
appealing. The recent identification, as UHC as one of 
the four central pillars for the new government, provides 
encouraging evidence for this.
The decisions might be subjected to a lot of political in-
terference… They (politicians) make decisions based on 
votes, will this get me more votes? So they do not tend to 
see that when we prevent malaria or prevent diarrhoea that 
you are going to get votes. Kenya county health respon-
dent, male 02
The influence of power, leadership capacity and values on 
priority-setting and decision making
In both Indonesia and Kenya, in the absence of a clear 
process and adequate capacity for determining guiding 
values and priorities, changing power dynamics following 
devolution became more important, with priorities 
being selected in line with the degree of ‘power over’ 
the decision-making process and values held by key 
decision-making actors. Capacity for setting priorities 
was widely discussed within Kenya, although it was less 
commonly described in Indonesia. This may have been 
as a consequence of the differing timeframes since the 
introduction of devolution reforms, since earlier study 
in Indonesia highlighted inequities in capacity between 
regions.46 A recent study in Kenya highlighted the vital 
importance of strong leadership capacity following 
reforms, providing examples of subcounty level managers 
having innovated and demonstrated flexibility to ensure 
essential services continue, despite uncertainty during 
the period immediately following devolution.47 Capacity 
of local officials has widely been acknowledged as crit-
ical to the success of devolution reforms.19 48–50 In Kenya, 
we observed differences in the levels of capacity for key 
decision makers between counties.33 Here the key leaders 
for health are the county executive committee member 
for health and the chief officer for health who may or 
may not have public health (or even health) or budg-
eting experience. Capacity also varied among other 
actors involved with decision making, including commu-
nity members and local politicians to understand health 
comprehensively (including preventive, promotive, reha-
bilitative and curative services) and their role for setting 
health priorities. This limited capacity was felt by nation-
al-level respondents to impede wise priority-setting.
… the capacity is not there, their priority is wrong some-
times and so decision-making sometimes gets messed up; 
we are ending up with decisions that will not necessarily 
address the health issues that we have. Kenya national re-
spondent, female 12
Across both countries, there was wide variation at 
subnational level in the values held by actors involved 
with planning and budgeting for health services. The 
process of priority-setting is inherently complex and 
value laden.51 As a result of differing values between 
actors, gaining a common consensus can be problem-
atic,51 and the process for identifying priorities should 
therefore involve decisions about which values or prin-
ciples should dominate.23 In literature from Indonesia, 
differing values contribute to varied priorities. At times, 
this was felt to cause leaders to prioritise development 
programmes deemed most profitable to them, which 
often led to neglect of health and social development 
programmes.52 From our study findings in Indonesia, 
respondents described that the priority-setting values of 
the subnational leaders in the study location did not lead 
to prioritisation of maternal and child health, which was 
felt to lead to limited allocation of funding, compared 
with other priorities. This contrasted with another area 
that had similarly high maternal mortality rates but had 
prioritised maternal health in local policy and budget 
allocation. These findings are in keeping with previous 
study in Indonesia.53
I know the government would do budget reducing, but 
they did too much especially in the budget for health sec-
tor… The government doesn’t care about the number of 
maternal and infant deaths. It looks like they just think that 
the maternal and infant death is a destiny. Indonesia vil-
lage midwife, female 15
In Kenya, there was no clear guidance surrounding 
the role of values in priority-setting. Values varied 
considerably between counties and between actors 
within a single county, leading to differing health prior-
ities during health planning and budgeting. Politicians 
tended to prioritise the need for an accountable rights-
based approach, typically emphasising the importance 
of the public participation meetings to validate priorities 
directly with community members, while technical actors 
tended to emphasise the need for effective, efficient and 
equitable priorities.33
In both Indonesia and Kenya, there were positive exam-
ples of priority-setting that have prioritised provision of 
quality, responsive health services. In Indonesia, published 
examples of positive deviant cases highlight innovation 
by district leaders to deliver services responsive to local 
needs, or which seek to improve both the quality and 
quantity of services provided.40 54 Meanwhile, in Kenya, 
selected counties are placing high value on community 
health services, leading to allocation of county govern-
ment funding, with one positive deviant county having 
sought to educate and empower actors across all levels 
(including community, political and technical actors) to 
understand health holistically and to actively participate 
in priority-setting.33 This was felt to have contributed to 
community identification of community health services 
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as a priority for inclusion within the county health plan 
and budget. The varied duration of devolution reforms 
allows us to identify lessons, such as the need for rigorous 
evaluation and learning between well-performing and 
poorly performing districts, which was felt to have been 
a missed opportunity in Indonesia.40 In Kenya, forums 
such as the county executive committee forum (a plat-
form for county executive committee members from all 
counties to meet together) provide scope for informal 
sharing of best practices and has provided an opportu-
nity for county executive committee members with an 
interest in community health approaches to promote 
awareness with their counterparts around community 
health and other critical health issues.
Community accountability and empowerment
Within Indonesia and Kenya, we found that limited actions 
have been introduced since devolution to promote citi-
zens’ understanding of health or their decision-making 
role. Across both Indonesia and Kenya, we found a host of 
barriers to effective citizen participation. While avenues 
for citizen participation are described in policy for both 
countries, in practice, a lack of funding and tokenistic 
implementation hinder opportunity for genuine involve-
ment of the community in identifying priorities. These 
findings are in keeping with previous studies in Kenya 
and in other devolved countries, including Tanzania and 
Philippines, where genuine community participation in 
health planning at the health facility level was limited.55–57
In Indonesia, community participation is described 
in policy through Musyawarah Perencanaan dan Pemban-
gunan, also known as musrengbang. These are multisectoral 
annual community consultative meetings for planning 
and development, involving community members, local 
community and religious leaders and representatives 
of local organisations. However, these meetings are not 
implemented as intended in many regions.42 Musrengbang 
are often only partially effective, as power is still retained 
by the village elite,58 with limited community knowledge 
or interest to participate.44 Within our study, the commu-
nity role in priority-setting was not commonly discussed 
by respondents in Indonesia. Instead respondents viewed 
community participation as the responsibility of the kader 
(who attended monthly village women’s meetings) or 
the puskesmas, rather than the community themselves. At 
times, this resulted in the village midwife (who represents 
the puskesmas) being blamed by the village head for 
health issues occurring within the catchment community.
If the puskesmas staff gave them all information about the 
jamkesda (District health Insurance) or Jamkesmas (Com-
munity health insurance), the village people would not 
have the wrong perception about that. Indonesia head of 
village, male 06
In Kenya, a similar finding emerged in terms of the 
role for the community in priority-setting described in 
policy, compared with the meaningfulness of their role 
in practice. Pre-existing avenues for citizen participation 
in accountability and decision making include commu-
nity and health facility management committees that 
continue with relatively unchanged roles and responsi-
bilities postdevolution. New avenues for engagement of 
citizens with state actors have been introduced since devo-
lution through public participation fora, whereby county 
authorities are responsible to facilitate public participa-
tion and involvement.59 Barriers to effective citizen partic-
ipation highlighted through our study include: failure to 
address barriers to attendance and active participation of 
hard-to-reach and marginalised groups, such as lack of 
funding for transport for those in remote areas, domi-
nance of discussion by local ‘elites’, advertisement of 
meetings at short notice in English language newspapers 
and a failure to address local patriarchal norms that limit 
women’s and youth’s active participation in the presence 
of men/elders. Respondents described that the setting 
of priorities was often strongly influenced by power plays 
and local politics, in keeping with previous findings that 
acknowledged the influence of social hierarchies, social, 
cultural and religious norms, economic and political divi-
sions and power asymmetries on participation in health 
facility management committees.60 61 Many of these 
barriers to citizen participation in selecting priorities 
have previously been described in Indonesia.42
Illiterate ones are never involved. They will not even know 
some of these processes [public participation]. Kenya 
county non-health respondent, male 19
Community health workers, positioned at the inter-
face between the community and the health system, are 
potentially key actors to promote community empower-
ment and engagement with the decision-making process 
as culturally and socially embedded members of their 
community.62 63 First, however, they themselves must be 
empowered, since they live, work and experience the 
same social norms and discriminations as the citizens 
within their community.64 They will need the support of 
both their community and the health system in order to 
perform this unique role.65
limitations
We used qualitative methods with a selected population 
making our findings difficult to generalise, quantify 
and rank in importance; instead our findings provide 
in-depth insights to the perspectives and experiences 
of stakeholders at different levels of the health system. 
There were a number of methodological challenges 
within our study that we carefully considered during the 
joint comparative analytical process. First, within Kenya, 
priority-setting was viewed from a range of respondent 
perceptions, with a strong emphasis on the subnational 
county level. Meanwhile in Indonesia respondent percep-
tions were primarily sought from community and CTC 
provider levels. Second, the study was carried out within 
one district in Indonesia, which was purposively selected 
for its poor maternal health indicators. By contrast, in 
Kenya, 10 counties were selected purposively to reflect 
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a range of health indicators. Third, the topic guides 
used in each country were different, although they did 
explore similar issues. Fourthly, the devolution processes 
were carried out over different time periods: with Kenya 
in the immediate period postdevolution, while Indonesia 
is 15 years postdevolution. This brought challenges to 
the direct comparative analysis and also enabled us to 
review the impact of devolution from longer and shorter 
term analytical lenses. Despite these limitations and 
differences, what is interesting is the strong commonality 
between contexts and respondents across both countries.
ConClusIons
Devolution reforms in Indonesia and Kenya have trans-
formed power relationships, increasing political, fiscal 
and administrative responsibilities at subnational levels 
and introducing opportunities for citizen participa-
tion for health system governance. These reforms have 
created a series of opportunities for health, and we found 
examples of positive actions to prioritise maternal health 
in both contexts. Since devolution, governance mecha-
nisms have implications for delivery of community health 
services, due to capture and distortion of the priority-set-
ting process for political and power interests, leading to 
an emphasis on tangible curative services over less visible 
health promotion and disease prevention services.
Analyses across different health systems contexts 
generate new insights: comparing priority-setting for 
community health across both countries, at differing 
points in their journey with devolution, providing oppor-
tunity for Kenya to learn from Indonesia’s longer expe-
rience with devolution. In Indonesia, we have observed 
practices and norms that have become entrenched within 
priority-setting processes, such as failure to adequately 
address pre-existing negative contextual norms and 
informal practices such as patronage, manipulation of 
power by local leaders to direct priorities favourable to 
them and their voters, varied capacity and values contrib-
uting to varied priorities between districts, limited actions 
to translate policy around community participation into 
meaningful citizen engagement within decision making. 
Meanwhile, in Kenya we heard examples of many of these 
same issues, not yet entrenched but on track to become 
so unless soon challenged.
Our findings, which highlight the implications of 
devolution over a longer timeframe from the Indonesia 
data, combined with the experiences and early find-
ings emerging within Kenya, present timely lessons for 
consideration within Kenya. First, we find that failure to 
address negative contextual norms and practices, such as 
patronage or nepotism, leads to their embedment and 
continuation at subnational levels, potentially leading 
to diversion of funds and priorities to more ‘politically 
influential’ individuals and groups, with neglect of histor-
ically marginalised groups. Second, devolution brings 
with it increasing local power and political influence. 
Unless the need for and benefit of public health services 
is understood by community members and politicians, 
this is likely to lead to continued preference for cura-
tive services and neglect of public health interventions, 
impeding progress towards UHC. Finally, there is the 
need to establish mechanisms for research and learning 
early in the devolution process to ensure that challenges 
identified are addressed, with best practices shared across 
counties. These recommendations present Kenya with 
ample opportunity and scope for evolution of Kenya’s 
devolved priority-setting processes towards achieving 
objectives for improved equity.
By identifying commonalities and differences between 
Indonesia and Kenya, including the differences in expe-
riences as a result of the differing timeframes with devo-
lution, our findings have potential to provide learning 
for other countries planning or implementing devolu-
tion reforms. We recommend practical strategies and 
their implementation to encourage meaningful citizen 
participation, actual intersectoral collaboration at subna-
tional levels across departments to address the under-
lying determinants of health and clear monitoring and 
feedback mechanism that challenge the negative norms 
and practices.
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